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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE TORTURE MEMos• 
Michael P. Schar/ 
This article explores the influence of international law in the evolution of 
the Bush Administration's policies toward detainees in the global war on 
terror. The detainee case study provides a modern lens for evaluating Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner's hypothesis set forth in THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW that international law exerts no "compliance pull" on 
American policymakers in times of crisis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to ascertain the influence of interna-
tional law in the formation of American foreign policy in time of crisis, 
using the case study of the White House Torture Memos as a backdrop. 
This article is a response to two books written by one of the authors 
of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) "Torture 
Memos," Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School, who had 
served as head of the OLC during the height of the Bush Administration's 
"global war on terror." In The Limits of International Law/ published in 
2005, Goldsmith employs rational choice theory to argue that international 
law is really just "politics" and that it is no more unlawful to contravene a 
treaty or a rule of customary international law than it would be to disregard 
a non-binding letter of intent. 2 In a memoir of his days as one of the Bush 
This article is a slightly revised and shortened version of Michael P. Scharf, Interna-
tional Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 
CARDozo L. REv. 45 (2009). A book-length treatment of this subject is forthcoming. 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMEs OF CRISIS: 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 20 I 0). 
t Michael P. Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko--Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law and 
Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity School of Law. He served as Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, 
and Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs in the Office of Legal Adviser of the U.S. 
Department of State from 1989-1993, and during a sabbatical in 2008 served as Special 
Assistant to the Prosecutor of the U.N.-established Cambodia Genocide Tribunal. 
I 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH AND ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
2 
I d. at 90. See also Eric Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey Internation-
al Law? 55 STAN. L. R. 1901 (2003). 
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Administratio~'s top lawyers, titled_ The Terr~r Presidency,3 published in 
2007, Goldsmith reveals the underlymg normative purpose behind The Lim-
its of International Law, namely to free the President from the shackles of 
international law in shaping a response to terrorism in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks. 
This article begins with a history of the scholarly debate about the 
binding nature of international law-the so-called compliance debate. This 
sets the stage for a critique of Goldsmith's contribution to the compliance 
debate. This is followed by an examination of the role that international law 
actually played in the Bush Administration's policies regarding the treat-
ment of detainees in the war on terror. The article ends with several conclu-
sions about the influence of international law on American foreign policy 
during times of crisis. 
II. THE COMPLIANCE DEBATE 
Since the decline of the Roman Empire and the attendant weaken-
ing of the Roman Legion at the end of the fourth century A.D., there has 
existed no sort of constabulary to implement rules of international law. Sub-
sequently, international rules have been subject to sporadic enforcement 
through protest and condemnation, reciprocal suspension of rights and bene-
fits, unilateral or multilateral economic and political sanctions, and some-
times through individual or collective use of anned force. 
Lacking a pervasive and effective enforcement mechanism, scholars 
and policy makers have pondered whether international law is really bind-
ing law. The question has been debated since ancient times and remains one 
of the most contested questions in international relations. As described be-
low, major historic developments, such as the Peace of Westphalia, the con-
clusion of the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War, the prolifera-
tion of international institutions in the 1970s and 80s, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have 
each rekindled and reshaped the debate. 
To tmderstand how the historic context affects the debate about 
whether international law is really law, it is helpful to draw upon the theory 
of Semiotics (pronounced sem-ee-AI-I-tiks). Semiotics (from the Greek 
semeion, meaning "sign"), was developed by Charles Peirce in the nine-
teenth century as the study of how the meaning of signs, symbols, and lan-
guage is constructed and understood.4 Umberto Eco made a wider audience 
aware of semiotics through several notable books, including his best-selling 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007). 
4 See generally 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: 
PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM (1935). 
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novel The Name of the Rose, which includes applied semiotic operations. 5 
Semiotics begins with the assumption that phrases, such as "international 
law," are not historic artifacts whose meaning remains static over time. Ra-
ther, the meaning of such terms changes along with the interpretive com-
munity or communities. As applied to law, semiotics theory posits that "dif-
ferent conceptions of the nature and character of the legal community give 
rise to different interpretations of the meaning of the rules and principles of 
. . 1 ,6 positive aw .... 
The modem age of international law is said to have been inaugu-
rated with the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years 
War by aclmowledging the sovereign authority of various European 
Princes. 7 During the next three-hundred years, up until World War II, there 
were four major schools of thought regarding the binding nature of interna-
tional law. 8 The first was "an Austinian positivistic realist strand," which 
held that nations never obey international law because it is not really law. 9 
The second was a "Hobbesian utilitarian, rationalistic strand" which held 
that nations sometimes follow international law, but only when it serves 
UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976); UMBERTO Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE ( 1986); UMBER TO ECO, THE NAME OF THE ROSE ( 1983). 
6 Wouter Werner, The Unnamed Third: Roberta Kevelson 's Legal Semiotics and the 
Development of International Law, 12 INT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 309. 309-31 (1999). See gener-
ally Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Legal Semiotics, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89 (1986). 
7 Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Unde1pinnings, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. 
& PoL'Y 373, 375 n.20 (2003). Footnote twenty states that: 
The Peace ofWestphalia was composed of two separate agreements: (1) the Treaty 
of Osnabrock concluded between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and her allies on 
the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on 
the other; and (2) the Treaty of Munster concluded between the Catholic King of 
France and his allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and 
the German Princes on the other. The Conventional view of the Peace of Westpha-
lia is that by recognizing the German Princes as sovereign, these treaties signaled 
the beginning of a new era. But in fact, the power to conclude alliances formally 
recognized at Westphalia was not unqualified, and was in fact a power that the 
German Princes had already possessed for almost half a century. Furthermore, al-
though the treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the Em-
pire remained a key actor according to the terms of the treaties. For example, the 
Imperial Diet retained the powers of legislation, warfare, and taxation, and it was 
through Imperial bodies, such as the Diet and the Courts, that religious safeguards 
mandated by the Treaty were imposed on the German Princes. 
Id. (citing Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy-Myth or Reality? 2 J. HIST. 
lNT'L L. 148 (2000)). 
8 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599,2614 (1997). 
9 I d. at 2611. See also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127, 
201 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832). 
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their self-interest to do so. 10 The third was a "Kantian liberal strand," which 
held that nations generally obey international law out of a sense of moral 
and ethical obligation derived from considerations of natural law and jus-
tice. 11 The fourth was a Bentham "process-based strand," which held that 
nations are induced to obey from the encouragement and prodding of other 
nations through a discursive legal process. 12 The modem debate has its roots 
in these four theoretical approaches. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Allies sought to es-
tablish a "new world order," replacing the "loose customary web of state-
centric rules" with a rules-based system built on international conventions 
and international institutions such as the U.N. Charter, which created the 
Security Council, General Assembly, and International Court of Justice; the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, which established the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund; and the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, 
which ultimate! y led to the creation of the World Trade Organization. 13 The 
new system reflected a view that international rules would promote Western 
interests, serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and emphasize values 
to be marshaled against fascist threats. 14 
Yet the effectiveness of the new system was immediately undercut 
by the intense bipolarity of the Cold War. In the 1940s, political science 
departments at U.S. universities received from the German refugees-.such 
as Hans Morgenthau who is credited with founding the field of international 
relations in the U.S.- "an image of international law as Weimar law writ 
large, formalistic, moralistic, and unable to influence the realities of interna-
tional life." 15 With fear of communist expansion pervading the debate, the 
positivistic, realist strand came to dominate Western scholarly discourse on 
the nature of international obligation. Thus, one of America's leading post-
war international relations theorists, George F. Kennan, attacked the Kan-
tian approach as anathema to American foreign policy interests, saying, "the 
belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspi-
rations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some 
ID Koh, supra note 8, at 2611; ARTIIUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW 
OF NATIONS 58-59, 112-25 (1947) (discussing the contributions of Hobs and other early 
positivists). 
II Koh, supra note 8, at 2611; Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch (1795), in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983 ). 
12 See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 538, 540, 552-54 (1843). 
13 Koh, supra note 8, at 2615. 
14 See Philippe Sands, Mischon Lecture 2005, Lawless World: International Law After 
9/11 and Iraq (May 18, 2005), available at https://www.ucl.ac.ukllaws/mishconldocs/ 
Mishcon _ 2005 _ Sands.pdf 
15 MARITI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 471 (2001). 
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system of legal rules and restraints" is an approach that "runs like a red 
skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years."16 
Even during the height of the Cold War, however, international law 
had its defenders, and within the American legal academy a new school of 
thought arose with roots in the Bentham strand, based on notions of legal 
process. Thus, the writings of Harvard Law professors Abram Chayes, 
Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld, and Yale Law professors Myres 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell, hypothesized that compliance with interna-
tional law could be explained by reference to the process by which these 
actors interact in a variety of public and private fora. 17 As Abram Chayes, 
who had himself once served as State Department Legal Adviser, put it: 
international law may not be determinative in international affairs, but it is 
relevant and influences foreign policy "first, as a constraint on action; 
second, as the basis of justification or legitimization for action; and third, as 
providing organizational structures, procedures, and forums" within which 
political decisions may be reached. 18 The process approach was later refined 
by Harvard Law Professors Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts and Yale Law 
Professor Harold Koh to include, in addition to States and international or-
ganizations, multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and 
private individuals, which all interact in a variety of domestic and interna-
tional fora to make, interpret, internalize, and enforce rules of international 
law. 19 
During the 1970s and 80s the legal landscape underwent another 
major transformation with the proliferation, growth, and strengthening of 
countless international regimes and institutions. Despite the bipolarity of the 
Cold War, international cooperation had persisted and was facilitated by 
treaties and organizations providing channels for dispute-settlement, requir-
ing states to furnish information regarding compliance, and authorizing reta-
liatory actions in cases on non-compliance. During this period, international 
relations scholars developed "regime theory," the study of principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern such areas as 
international peacekeeping and dept management. 20 At heart, the regime 
16 GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1984). 
17 
Professor Koh distinguishes between the Harvard and Yale methods, observing that the 
Harvard approach focused on process as policy constraint while the New Haven approach 
was more value oriented, focusing on process as policy justification. See Koh, supra note 8, 
at 2623. 
18 
See ABRAM CHA YES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE 
OF LAW 7 (1974). See also ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968). 
19 
See HENRY STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1994). 
20 
See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT 0. 
KEOHANE JR., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS THEORY (1989). 
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theorists were rationalists, viewing compliance with international law as 
function of the benefits such compliance provides. a 
This same period saw a revival of the Kantian philosophical tradi-
tion. NYU Law Professor Thomas Franck sought to answer the question 
"Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?" in his path-breaking The 
Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. 21 Frank's answer: "Because they 
perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of 
legitimacy."22 According to Frank, it is the legitimacy of the process that 
"exerts a pull to compliance .... "23 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989 had a significant impact on compliance scholarship. With the disman-
tling of the Berlin Wall, the end of Apartheid in South Africa, and the Unit-
ed Nation's defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm, the 1990s 
were a period of unparalleled optimism about the prospects of international 
law and international institutions. At the same time, conflicts in failed states 
like Somalia and Haiti, the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and 
the tribal carnage in Rwanda presented new challenges that severely tested 
the efficacy of international rules and institutions. Meanwhile, the status of 
the U.S. as the "sole remaining superpower" encouraged triumphalism, ex-
ceptionalism, and an upsurge of U.S. provincialism and isolationism, as 
well as a preference to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. 24 During 
this decade, scholarly writing about compliance with international law fea-
hlred four prevailing views. 
The first view was an "instrumentalist" strand which, like its prede-
cessors, applied rational choice theory to argue that States only obey inter-
national law when it serves their self-interest to do so. What differentiated 
modern rationalists such as Robert Keohanee, 25 Duncan Snidal, 26 Kenneth 
Abbott, 27 and John Setear28 from their realist forerunners was the sophistica-
tion of their version of the prisoner's dilemma game, introducing interna-
tional institutions and transnational actors, disaggregating the State into its 
21 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990). 
22 Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
23 Id. at 26. 
24 See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW lN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 7 (2004). 
25 See Robert 0. Keohane, Jr., International Relations and International Law: Two Optics 
9 (Sherrill Lecture, Yale Law School), quoted in Koh, supra note 8, at 2632 n.l71. 
26 See Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for Interna-
tional Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Scr. REv. 923 (1985). 
27 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lrnvyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989). 
28 See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International 
Relations Themy and International Law, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996). 
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component parts, and incorporating notions of long-term as well as short-
term interests. 
The second view was a "liberal internationalist" strand, led by the 
Dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who 
posited that compliance depends on whether or not the State can be charac-
terized as "liberal" in identity (e.g., marked by a democratic representative 
government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and an independent 
judicial system). 29 Slaughter and other liberal theorists argued that liberal 
democracies are more likely to comply with international law in their rela-
tions with one another, while relations between liberal and illiberal states 
will more likely be conducted without serious deference to international 
law. 
The third view, an outgrowth of Kantian theory, was a "constructiv-
ist" strand, which argued that the norms of international law, the values of 
the international community, and the structure of international society have 
the power to reshape national interests. 30 According to the constmctivists, 
States obey international rules because a repeated habit of obedience trans-
forms their interests so that they come to value rule compliance. 
The fourth post-cold war view was a refurbishment of the Har-
vard/New Haven "institutionalist approach," as embodied in works by Ab-
ram/Antonia Chayes and Harold Koh. In The New Sovereignty, the Chayes-
es dismiss the importance of coercive enforcement, pointing out that "sanc-
tioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and 
likely to be ineffective when used."31 Instead, they offer a "management 
model" in which compliance is induced through interactive processes of 
justification, discourse, and persuasion. According to the Chayeses, the im-
petus for compliance is not so much a nation's fear of sanction as it is fear 
of diminution of status through loss of reputation. To improve compliance, 
the Chayeses propose a range of "instruments of active management," such 
as transparency, reporting and data collection, verification and monitoring, 
dispute settlement, capacity-building, and strategic review and assessment. 
Harold Koh, who was appointed State Department Legal Adviser of 
the Obama Administration in 2009, has sought to add an additional level of 
29 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 503 (1995). 
30 See generally THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURJTY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD 
POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4-8 (Robert J. Becket al. eds., 1996); 
FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF 
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
(1991). 
31 
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 32-33 (1995). 
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sophistication to process theory by explaining how and why States internal-
ize the constraining norms through judicial incorporation, legislative embo-
diment, and executive acceptance. 32 According to Koh, when a State fails to 
comply with international law, frictions are created that can negatively af-
fect the conduct of a State's foreign relations and frustrate its foreign policy 
goals. 33 To avoid such frictions in its continuing interactions, the State will 
shift over time from a policy of violation to one of grudging compliance to 
eventual habitual internalized obedience. 34 
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE GOLDSMITH PARADIGM 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of 
September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 inaugurated the 
current period of compliance scholarship. In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. 
implemented policies regarding the detention and treatment of suspected 
terrorists that were harshly criticized at home and abroad as inconsistent 
with international law requirements. In seeking to minimize the impact of 
international law on the Bush Administration's foreign policy agenda, then 
Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, said, "[i]t is a big mistake for us to 
grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-
term interest to do so-because, over the long term, the goal of those who 
think that international law really means anything are those who want to 
constrict the United States. "35 The term "lawfare" was coined, 36 and the 
Bush Administration's official 2005 National Defense Strategy compared 
the use of international ''judicial processes" to terrorism, concluding that 
32 Koh, supra note 8, at 2602-()3, 2641. 
!d. at 2617, 2635. 33 
34 !d. at 2655-56. 
35 Samantha Power, Boltonism, NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 2005, at 23, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/05032lta_talk_power (last visited Oct. 24, 
2009). Bolton has also written: "International law is not law; it is a series of political and 
moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else is simply theolo-
gy and superstition masquerading as law." John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in Inter-
national Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000) (Bolton served as 
Under Secretary of State for Anus Control and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. during the 
George W. Bush Administration). 
36 The term was apparently coined by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. at a speech at 
Harvard's Carr Center in 2001. Major General Dunlap defined "lawfare" as "the strategy of 
using-or misusing-law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an opera-
tional objective." Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. INT'L A.FF. 
146 (2008), available at www.nimj.org/documents/Lawfare%20Today.pdf. As neoconserva-
tive lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey have put it, lawfare aims to "gain a moral advan-
tage over your enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in 
national and international tribunals." Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush's War on the 
Rule of Law, HARPER's, July 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/ 
07/0081595. 
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both are "strategies of the weak" that threaten "our strength as a nation 
state."37 The Administration even persuaded Congress to enact legislation 
that prohibited U.S. courts from considering international law or jurispru-
dence in determining the validity of detentions of suspected terrorists at 
Guantfmamo Bay.38 
It was in this context that Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, 
who had served as Assistant Attorney General and head of DOJ' s Office of 
Legal Counsel from October 2003 to June 2004, along with Chicago Uni-
versity Law Professor Eric Posner, published The Limits of International 
Law at the start of the Bush Administration's second tenn in 2005.39 The 
book, which is an expanded and more sophisticated version of Posner's 
2003 article, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International 
Law?,40 deploys economic-based rational choice theory, using modeling 
techniques derived from game theory, to advance the thesis that neither cus-
tomary international law nor treaty-based international law have any "ex-
ogenous influence on State behavior."41 In other words, according to 
Goldsmith and Posner, when States act in accordance with international law 
it is not because of its moral pull or a preference for abiding with law, but 
rather solely due to self-interest. 42 
Using a variety of illustrative historical case studies involving inter-
national Agreements (e.g., human rights treaties and trade treaties) as well 
as customary international law (e.g., ambassadorial immunity and free pas-
sage of neutral ships), Goldsmith and Posner propound four models that 
seek to explain away the behavior that legal scholars have tenned "com-
pliance" with international law. The first model, "coincidence of interest," 
essentially proposes that States may act in accordance with international law 
simply by acting in their own self-interest, with no regard to international 
rules or the interests of other States.43 The second model, "coordination," 
describes instances in which two or more states create and abide by a rule 
not out of a sense of obligation, but simply because it is convenient. 44 The 
third model, "cooperation," applies to situations in which States reciprocally 
refrain from activities that would otherwise be in their short-term self-
37 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMEIUCA 6 (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil!news/ 
Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf. 
38 See Military Commissions Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
39 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1. 
40 
Posner, supra note 2, at 1918. 
41 
GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra note 1, at 39, 43, 108. 
42 
Id. at 225. See also Edward Swaine, Restoring and (Risking) Interest in International 
Law, 100 AM. J. lNT'L L. 259 (2006) (book review of GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1 ). 
43 
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 111. 
44 Id. at 32. 
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interest in order to reap larger long-term benefits. 45 The fourth model 
"coercion," results when a State with greater power forces a weaker State t~ 
engage in acts that benefit the more powerful State. 46 
Based on their rational choice analysis, Goldsmith and Posner con-
clude that States have no preference for compliance with international law· 
they are unaffected by the "legitimacy" of a rule of law; past consent to ~ 
rule does not generate compliance; and decision makers do not internalize a 
norm of compliance with international law. States therefore employ interna-
tional law when it is convenient, are free to ignore it when it is not, and 
have every right to place their sovereign interests first-indeed democratic 
States have an obligation to do so when international law threatens to un-
dermine federalism, separation of powers, and domestic sovereignty. 47 
The potential impact of Goldsmith and Posner's work cannot be 
overstated. George Washington University Law Professor Edward Swaine 
writes that U.S. elites may seize on Goldsmith and Posner's book to justify 
noncompliance with international law and may have done so already.48 As 
Professor Allen Buchanan of Duke University has pointed out, Goldsmith 
and Posner's "normative claims, if valid, would lend support to the view 
that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a purely in-
strumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do not have 
a moral obligation to try to prevent their government from doing so."49 Fi-
nally, Professor Mary Ellen O'Cmmell of Notre Dame warns, "[a] policy-
maker reading the book might well conclude that compliance with interna-
tional law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the Convention against 
T . . I ,so orture, IS opt10na .... 
While many realists and rationalists immediately embraced 
Goldsmith and Posner's approach and conclusions, their book was met with 
criticism by institutionalists and constructivists who sought to disprove their 
thesis in several ways. To start with, Professor Peter Spiro of Temple Uni-
versity points out that many of Goldsmith and Posner's reasons for dismiss-
ing international law as something less than real law would apply to domes-
tic law as well. 51 Goldsmith and Posner's assertion that "[ d]omestic law is 
45 Id. at 112. 
46 Id. at 115. 
47 Goldsmith and Posner are particularly concerned about international law's propensity to 
shift decisional authority from local government and the federal executive to international 
institutions and activist federal judges. 
48 See Swaine, supra note 42, at 265. 
49 Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L 
COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006). 
50 MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (2009). 
51 See Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L CoMP. L. 445 
(2006). 
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enforced in well-ordered societies," whereas "international law is not relia-
bly enforced, "52 flies in the face of the actual data, including the fact that 
murder cases have only a sixty-five percent clearance rate in the U.S. 53 
Although international law has traditionally employed horizontal ra-
ther than vertical mechanisms of enforcement (such as protests, reciprocal 
suspension of compliance, and breaking of diplomatic relations) and such 
enforcement has rarely been bolstered by the use of force, this "does not 
necessarily detract from its salience as a regulator of behavior."54 It just 
means international law is more like domestic contract law than domestic 
tort or criminal law. And while some States violate the Torh1re Conven-
tion's prohibitions on inhumane treatment, the Geneva Convention's prohi-
bition on war crimes, and the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of force, 
this does not mean that these international rules have no consequence. As 
with the sixty-five miles-per-hour speed limit, international law may not 
exert a moral pull nor enjoy perfect compliance, but it does deter and con-
strain unlawful behavior at the margins. Finally, while nearly all interna-
tional law scholars will acknowledge that if State interests are powerful 
enough they may trump contrary international law norms, the same is true 
with respect to contracts in domestic law. That a business or individual may 
chose to break a legally binding contract (and suffer the consequences the-
reof) does not mean that contract law is not real law. 
Another criticism of the Goldsmith and Posner paradigm, made by 
Professor Kenneth Anderson of American University, concerns their under-
lying assumption that the only possible basis of legal obligation is morality. 
Anderson points out that a sense of legal obligation can be based on instru-
mentalist concerns about reputation as a law-abiding State, long-tenn self-
interest in the maintenance of order, or long-term self-interest in a function-
ing legal system. 55 In seeking to circumvent this objection, Goldsmith and 
Posner never explain what they believe constitutes the self-interests of 
States. Rather, they provide a circular approach that is so open-ended that it 
renders their theory "an empty vessel."56 In particular, critics argue that by 
defining reputation as one of a State's instrumentalist interests rather than 
considering it part of the pull of international law, Goldsmith and Posner 
have rendered their theory non-falsifiable and lacking in predictive value. 
As Professor Daniel Bodanslci of University of Georgia notes, under 
52 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 195. 
53 Spiro, supra note 51, at 452 n.16 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs!homicide/cleared.h1m (last visited Oct. 24, 2009)). 
~ s . 4 prro, supra note 51, at 51. 
55 See Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits of Interna-
tional Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 253 (2006). 
56 I d. at 280-81. 
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Goldsmith and Posner's approach, "international law cannot be an exogen-
ous influence on state behavior for the simple reason that it has already been 
made endogenous. "57 
Goldsmith and Posner attempt to answer this criticism by observing 
that in any event reputational considerations have little impact on State be-
havior. 58 But Professor David M. Go love of New York University takes 
issue with this supposition, which arises out of Goldsmith and Posner's sin-
gle-issue game approach using the prisoner's dilemma model. According to 
Professor Golove, the metaphorical games that States actually play are vast-
ly more complex. "States repeatedly and intensively interact across a wide 
range of subject areas, and they do so indefinitely into the future." 59 View-
ing international interaction instead as a "super game" requires that signifi-
cantly more value be placed on reputation than Goldsmith and Posner are 
willing to acknowledge. States obtain a benefit if they are perceived as reli-
able partners not just with the particular State on the particular issue in 
question in a given interaction, but also with third States on a range of is-
sues long into the future. Moreover, once a norm is named a customary in-
ternational law rule or is codified in a treaty to which a State is a party, vi-
olation of that norm will have far more serious reputational costs. 60 
Goldsmith and Posner's response is to argue that State reputations 
are compartmentalized. For example, they assert that a State might have a 
good record complying with trade treaties and a bad record complying with 
environmental treaties, and that the State's trading partners will not hold its 
environmental shortcomings against it. 61 If this were true, answers Go love, 
it would only mean that preserving the State's reputation as a law abiding 
State would be more significant with respect to that State's trade relations 
than in the environmental area; it would not mean that reputation is irrele-
vant. Nor does Goldsmith and Posner's self-evident assertion that "a reputa-
tion for compliance will not always be of paramount concern"62 mean that 
reputation should automatically be dismissed as inconsequential. If 
compliance reputation makes a difference in the margins, putting a thumb 
on the scale in favor of compliance, then it is neither irrelevant nor 
inconsequential. 
57 Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 
285, 295 (2006). 
58 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 100-04. 
59 David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and 
Posner's The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333,345 (2006). 
60 Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEx. L. REv. 
1265, 1294 (2006) (book review of GOLDSMITH& POSNER, supra note 1). 
61 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 102. 
62 Id. at 103. 
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A further criticism of the Goldsmith and Posner approach is that in 
order to fit within their simplified prisoner dilemma game theory, 
Goldsmith and Posner begin with the assumption that the relevant actor is 
the "State" as a unitary player, represented by what Goldsmith and Posner 
call its leaders. 63 The State as they conceive it does not reflect multiple 
power bases and multiple agendas. To better mirror reality, Professor Spiro 
suggests that the State should be disaggregated and understood as a nexus of 
competing and contradictory actors which influence its behavior, including 
bureaucratic subsets within the Executive Branch, political subsets within 
the Congress, Supreme Court and lower court judges, as well as nongo-
vernmental organizations outside the government. 64 
A fmal critique concerns Goldsmith and Posner's methodology. 
According to Professor Andrew T. Guzman of California Berkely's Boalt 
Hall School of Law, Goldsmith and Posner's aim is to debunk the construc-
tivist theory of compliance, but they do so through selective use of a hand-
ful of case studies which are no more than anecdotal in nature, and their 
identification of the controlling state interests in each is almost entirely con-
jectural. 65 In addition, Goldsmith and Posner offer no explanation for how 
they chose the particular historical events that they employ, nor do they cite 
to other scholars of history or political science who concur with their ap-
praisals of those events. In contrast, several scholars that have carefully 
examined the case studies set forth in The Limits of International Law have 
concluded that "at least some of those case studies are consistent with com-
peting claims."66 
Moreover, where a case study reveals a State's compliance with an 
accepted rule (as most of Goldsmith and Posner's do), it is difficult to de-
termine without qualitative empirical data (which Goldsmith and Posner do 
not provide) whether the State complied out of self-interest, out of a sense 
of duty to uphold the law, or a mix of both. As Professor Oona Hathaway 
points out, with respect to international law, which is primarily consent-
based, "utility seeking and law-abiding behavior is often identical."67 Pro-
fessor Golove observes that "Goldsmith and Posner make little effort to 
63 See generally id. 
64 See Spiro, supra note 51, at 454--62. 
65 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 533, 540 
(2006) (book review of GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1 ). 
66 Guzman, supra note 65, at 540 (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner misrepresent the 
facts in their international trade case study); Golove, supra note 59, at 353 (arguing that 
Goldsmith and Posner's account is cherry-picked and fails to present a fair picture of the 
"Free Ships, Free Goods" example). 
67 
Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International 
Law, I 19 HARv. L. REv. 1404, 1442 (2006) (book review of GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra 
note 1). 
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investigate direct historical evidence . . . of the actual motivations of the 
individuals who made the decisions on which they focus .... Instead they 
focus on the events themselves and draw speculative inferences about why 
States acted as they did. " 68 
IV. JUST A MATTER OF SEMANTICS? 
"When I use a word, " Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful 
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more nor less." 
"The question is" said Alice, "whether you can make words mean 
so many different things. " 
-Lewis Carroll "Through the Looking Glass" (1871) 
In The Limits of International Law, Goldsmith and Posner aclmowl-
edge that international legal rules exert influence on State behavior through 
concern about negative publicity, diminution of reputation, reduced interna-
tional cooperation, and retaliation69 and that as a consequence States usually 
act in accordance with customary international law and treaty law. 70 What 
difference does it make, then, if international law is labeled "binding" law 
or not? Why the focus on whether or not government officials should perce-
ive a "moral" obligation to comply with international law? In light of 
Goldsmith and Posner's self-identified "instrumentalist" mind set, another 
way to put this question is: what are they trying to accomplish by seeking to 
prove that international law is not real law? And, in semiotic terms, who are 
they seeking to influence and why? 
A recent essay in The American Interest by Nicholas Rostow, who 
served as Chief Counsel of the National Security Council (NSC) dming the 
administration of George H. W. Bush and subsequently as Legal Adviser of 
the U.S. Mission to the U.N. during the administration of George W. Bush, 
points to the answer to this question. According to Rostow: 
[C]riticism of the United States on international law grounds is especially 
notable because of the very nature of the United States as a country: the 
United States is defined by law. Its oaths of citizenship and office holding 
are pledges to the Constitution, not to a flag, not to a territory, not to the 
mother or fatherland, and, of course, not to a sovereign. The law defines 
who an American is, and it binds each of us to every other. 
68 Golove, supra note 59, at 348 (citing as an example GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 
1, at 49-50). 
69 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 90. 
70 Id. at 165. 
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That is part of the reason why the United States cannot long sustain for-
eign policies at odds with international law: In the end, Americans will not 
support them. The American people ask "Is it legal?" before they ask any 
other question about foreign policy actions short of self-defense against di-
. 71 
rect aggressiOn. 
Rostow's observation suggests that as long as policymakers, bureaucrats, 
and the general public believe that compliance with international law is nn-
portant, this belief will have a significant impact on State decision-making. 
In his 2007 memoir The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith identifies 
himself as "part of a group of conservative intellectuals-dubbed 'new so-
vereigntists' in Foreign Affairs magazine-who were skeptical about the 
creeping influence of international law on American law."72 In his 2007 
book, Goldsmith reveals the underlying normative purpose behind The Lim-
its of International Law. Goldsmith writes: 
Many people think the Bush administration has been indifferent to war-
time legal constraints. But the opposite is true: the administration has been 
strangled by law, and since September 11, 2001, this war has been la-
wyered to death. The administration has paid attention to law not necessar-
ily because it wanted to, but rather because it [believed that it] had no 
choice.73 
While Special Counsel to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and later 
as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, 
Goldsmith saw it as his mission to convince those inside the government 
that international rules that constrain U.S. power and thus compromise na-
tional security are not really binding. 
A 2003 inter-agency memo prepared by Goldsmith, titled The Judi-
cialization of International Politics, warns: "In the past quarter century, 
various nations, NGOs, academics, international organizations, and others 
in the 'international community' have been busily weaving a web of inter-
national laws and judicial institutions that today threatens [U.S. Govern-
71 
Nicholas Rostow, Law Abiding: Restoring America's Global Reputation, AM. INTEREST 
81 (Jan.-Feb. 2008). 
72 
1d 
73 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 21. Goldsmith states: 
My academic objections to this trend were based on the need for democratic con-
trol over the norms that governed American conduct. My scholarship argued 
against the judicial activism that gave birth to international human rights lawsuits 
in U.S. courts. It decried developments in "customary international law" that pur-
ported to bind the United States to international rules to which the nation's political 
leaders had not consented. 
GOLDSMlTII, supra note 3, at 69. 
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ment] interests .... " 74 The memo continues: "The [U.S. Government] has 
seriously underestimated this threat, and has mistakenly assumed that con-
fronting the threat will worsen it. ... Unless we tackle the problem head-on 
it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent because of the un~ 
usual challenges we face in the war on terrorism." 75 The Limits of Interna-
tional Law can therefore be understood as Goldsmith's effort to bring this 
"anti-lawfare" argument to a wider audience. 
Goldsmith recounts how when he advised White House Chief 
Counsel Alberto Gonzales that "[t]he President can also ignore the law, and 
act extralegally," citing "honorable precedents, going back to the founding 
of the nation, of defying legal restrictions in time of crisis," Gonzales 
"looked at me as ifl were crazy."76 Goldsmith offers the following explana-
tion for the Attorney General's reaction: 
The post-Watergate hyper-legalization of warfare, and the attendant proli-
feration of criminal investigators, had become so ingrained and threatening 
that the very idea of acting extralegally was simply off the table, even in 
times of crisis. The President had to do what he had to do to protect the 
country. And the lawyers had to find some way to make what he did 
legal. 77 
. Disdaining the hypocrisy enshrined in the Bush Administration's 
approach, in The Limits of International Law Goldsmith has sought to put 
the idea of openly defying international law back on the table by convincing 
policymakers, bureaucrats, and the American public that international law is 
not real law but merely "a special kind of politics"78 that can be ignored 
whenever government officials believe it is in the national interest to do so. 
Understood in this light, The Limits of International Law is not really a de-
scriptive account of how international law actually works, but an effort to 
alter public perceptions about the importance of international law in order to 
expand presidential power in foreign relations. 79 According to Professor 
Oona Hathaway of Yale Law School, there is a necessary connection be-
tween Goldsmith and Posner's underlying "revisionist" political agenda and 
their book's methodological approach and conclusions. 80 As Professor Mar-
garet McGuinness of University of Missouri-Columbia observes, "[t]he 
book cannot be viewed as separate from the authors' broader normative 
74 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 60. 
75 !d. 
76 !d. at 80. 
77 !d. at 80-81 (emphasis added). 
78 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note I, at 202; Posner, supra note 2, at 1918. 
79 Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34 
GA. J. INT'L & CaMP. L. 393,421 (2006). 
80 Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 67, at 1404. 
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project-a project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in international 
institutions and to limit the application of international law in the United 
States by expanding presidential power and limiting the role of the 
judiciary. "81 
Goldsmith and Posner are not, however, merely tilting at windmills, 
and their work is unlikely to be the "Alamo" of the realist school, as one 
commentator colorfully suggested. 82 Rather, their venture must be viewed in 
the context of recognition of the power of tactical words and phrases to fun-
damentally alter popular attitudes and perceptions. The leading expert in 
this area today is Frank Luntz, a Republican political consultant, Fox News 
pundit, and author of The Luntz Republican Playbook, a strategy memo that 
has been widely employed by Republican political candidates. 83 In 1994, 
Luntz found through focus group research that "death tax" kindled voter 
resentment in a way that the phrases "inheritance tax" and "estate tax" did 
not. 84 He shared his findings with Republican leaders, who included the 
new formulation in the GOP's "Contract with America."85 Soon the term 
"death tax" began to appear in news shows and newspaper articles and was 
even included in the title of the legislation that ultimately repealed the estate 
tax, the "Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000." In the years since then, Luntz 
bas spear-beaded the Republican effort to frame the debate on dozens of 
other salient political issues through creative use of language. Examples of 
this include changing the phrases "oil drilling" to "energy exploration," "tax 
cuts" to "tax relief," "undocumented workers" to "illegal aliens," "private 
school vouchers" to "parental choice," "global warming" to "climate 
change," "late-term abortion" to "partial-birth abortion," and perhaps most 
relevant to our discussion, renaming the effort to suppress terrorism the 
"Global War on Terror," dubbing "kidnapping" "extraordinary rendition," 
referring to "detainees" as "unlawful enemy combatants" and calling "tor-
ture" "enhanced interrogation."86 
81 See McGuinness, supra note 79, at 421 (citing Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating 
International Criminal Court, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 89, 95 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, The Current fllegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORD. L. 
REV.319 (1997)). 
82 s . p1ro, supra note 51, at 446. 
83 An excerpt of the Frank Luntz Republican Playbook, Part X "Appendix: The 14 Words 
Never to Use," was leaked and posted on the internet. See Tom Ball, Frank Luntz Republican 
Playbook-Searchable Text-Version: Part X Appendix: The 14 Words Never To Use, PoL. 
STRATEGY.ORG, Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.politicalstrategy.org/archives/001208.php (provid-
ing links to downloadable PDFs) (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). See also Matt Bai, The Framing 
Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 43, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/ 
07/17 /magazinell7DEMOCRA TS.html. 
84 
See Ball, supra note 83. 
85 See id. 
86 !d. 
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Over the years, Democratic politicians and liberal commentators 
have practiced these word games as well. They have, for example, altered 
the moniker "pro-abortion" to "pro-choice" in the 1970s and re-branded 
Ronald Reagan's missile defense initiative "Star Wars" in the 1980s. 
Luntz's counterpart on the Democratic side is Professor George Lakoff of 
Berkeley University, best-selling author of Don't Think of an Elephant, and 
founder of a political consulting firm known as the Rockridge Institute. 87 
Lakoff has convinced the Democratic leadership that Republican success 
has been in part due to skilled use of loaded language, along with constant 
repetition, enabling the phrases to enter the everyday lexicon and thereby 
bias the debate in favor of conservatives. Following Lakoff's advice, in the 
2008 national elections, Democrats began referring to themselves as "pro-
gressives" instead of "liberals," labeled the Bush Administration's Iraq 
strategy "escalation" instead of "surge," and called "deficit spending" "eco-
nomic stimulus." 
In the context of international law and foreign policy, the impor-
tance of labeling can be clearly demonstrated with respect to the develop-
ment and use of the euphemistic term "ethnic cleansing" as an alternative 
for "genocide." Although the Genocide Convention does not generally re-
quire countries to take action to halt genocide outside their borders, 88 gov-
ernments have found that the term "genocide," with its roots in the Holo-
caust, has a unique power to create often irresistible public pressure on a 
government to act. Consequently, in order to preserve their options or 
excuse inaction, governments prefer to instead employ the term "ethnic 
cleansing" to describe mass atrocities. 
While the term "ethnic cleansing" is frequently attributed as a lin-
guistic creation of Serb leaders in 1992 to describe their policy of ridding 
parts of Bosnia of Muslims, in fact the term was an invention of journalists 
and it was propagated first by the U.S. and then by the U.N., not the Serbs. 
In March 1993, the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser prepared a 
memorandum for the Secretary of State, opining that the information in the 
government's possession was sufficient to legally conclude that a one-sided, 
well-organized campaign of genocide was taking place in Bosnia, but Secre-
tary of State Warren Christopher nevertheless refused to use the "the G-
word."89 When asked while testifying before Congress, "[d]oesn't ethnic 
cleansing qualify as genocide," Secretary Christopher answered in the 
negative, insisting "there are atrocities on all sides" and that Bosnia was 
87 See Bai, supra note 83, at 43. 
88 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www .icj-cij. org/docket/files/91/ 13 685. pdf. 
89 Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Ten·orism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE 
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 567, 569 (2007). 
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essentially an "ethnic feud" and therefore "somewhat different from the 
1 t 
,go Ho ocaus. 
In response, several mid-level State Department officials took the 
extraordinary step of resigning to protest the Secretary of State's intentional 
obfuscation of the truth about the Bosnian atrocities, whose purpose was to 
allow the Administration to maintain that there was no moral or legal un-
perative for U.S. military intervention in Bosnia.91 Conrad Harper, the Legal 
Adviser at the time, recalls: 
In my view it was genocide. But there were a lot of policy concerns about 
being that blunt, including what obligation we had under the Genocide 
Convention to act-so it was a tap dance. But I never had any doubt in my 
own mind, and I made it clear that was my view. But the Legal Adviser 
doesn't make the ultimate decisions, even about characterizing something 
as an international crime. 92 
A year later, while 800,000 Tutsis were being massacred by Hutus 
in Rwanda, the U.S. State Department similarly engaged in what genocide 
chronicler Samantha Power later characterized as "a two-month dance to 
avoid the g-word."93 A subsequently leaked Pentagon discussion paper on 
the unfolding crisis in Rwanda revealed the purpose behind this strategy, 
warning that a "[g]enocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to 
actually 'do something. "'94 Consistent with this, in a comprehensive study 
covering 1990-2005, which was published in the European Journal of Pub-
lic Health, researchers found that the term "ethnic cleansing" was frequently 
used by government officials and U.N. bodies instead of "genocide" to 
downplay urgency "leading to inaction in preventing current and future ge-
90 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping the War Within Borders, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 19,1993, atA10. 
91 The resigning officials included George Kenney, Deputy head of the Bosnia Desk; 
Marshall Harris, head of the Bosnia Desk; Jon Western of the Intelligence and Research 
Bureau; and Steven Walker, the head of the Croatian Desk. See Norman Kempster, 41h U.S. 
Aide Quits Over Balkan Policy, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at 10 ofNews Section. One 
of the officials who resigned, Marshall Harris, told the press, "It's genocide and the Secretary 
of State won't identify it as such. That's where we get beyond the political to the moral." 
Daniel Williams, A Third State Department Official Resigns over Balkan Policy, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 24, 1993, at Al. 
92 
Conrad Harper, Remarks at the Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Apr. 28, 2004), transcript reproduced in 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIME OF CRJSIS: 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (forthcom-
ing 2010). 
93 
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERJCA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 359 
(2007). 
94 
Joanne Mariner, Is Genocide Just a Word?, CoUNTERPUNCH.ORG, Sept. 15, 2004, 
http://www .counterpunch.org/mariner09152004.html. 
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nocides."95 Concluding that "the term 'ethnic cleansing' corrupts observa-
tion, interpretation, ethical judgment and decision-making," the authors of 
the study argue that the Public Health community "should lead the way in 
expunging the term 'ethnic cleansing' from official use." 96 
It turned out that the Pentagon was right to be concerned about the 
power of the "G-word," as the George W. Bush Administration learned the 
hard way ten years after the crisis in Rwanda. In June 2004, the U.S. Con-
gress and the State Department announced their determination that the 
atrocities in Darfur, Sudan amounted to genocide. 97 A year later, when 
France and the U.K. submitted a Security Council resolution to authorize 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exercise jurisdiction over the Dar-
fur situation, the Bush Administration realized that by having labeled the 
atrocities genocide it could not get away with voting against the resolution 
despite its opposition to the ICC. 98 As a result, subsequent to abstaining on 
the resolution, the Bush Administration found that it could no longer assert 
that the ICC was an illegitimate and inherently unfair institution, and be-
cause the power of the Security Council was now on the line, the Adminis-
tration had to support efforts to compel the surrender of indicted Sudanese 
officials to the ICC. 
Echoing the underlying premise of semiotic theory, both Luntz and 
Lakoff argue that the most important resource a politician or policy-maker 
has is the way in which people understand the world and therefore interpret 
the message. As Luntz puts it, "[i]t's not what you say, it's what people 
hear."99 Thus, Luntz and Lakoff advocate "framing," that is, choosing the 
language to define a debate, which is exactly what Posner and Goldsmith 
have sought to accomplish through The Limits of International Law. At the 
same time that Goldsmith and Posner decline to acknowledge the ways in-
ternational law may influence legal consciousness, by seeking to convince 
the public that it is no more "illegal" to contravene international law than it 
would be to disregard a non-binding letter of intent, 100 "they themselves are 
95 Rony Blum et al., Ethnic Cleansing Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 204,204 (2008). 
96 Id. 
97 Mahmood Mamdani, The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency, 
LONDON REv. BooKS, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n05/ 
mamdO l.html. 
98 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
99 See FRANK LUNTZ, WORDS THAT WoRK, IT'S NOT WHAT You SAY, IT'S WHAT PEOPLE 
HEAR (2007). 
100 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 90; Posner, supra note 2, at 1901. 
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nevertheless attempting to affect legal consciOusness m the United 
States." 101 
George Orwell discussed the power of language to alter societal 
conceptions in his famous 1946 essay Politics and the English Language102 
and then brought the theory to life in his fictional masterpiece 1984. 103 Par-
ticularly prophetic was 1984's portrayal of propaganda by labeling and 
through re-definition of words. Thus, the "Ministry of Peace" in the novel 
actually deals with war, the "Ministry of Love" is in charge of torturing 
people, and the mandate of the "Ministry of Truth" is to revise historical 
records to match the government's version of the past and to develop 
''Newspeak," the government's minimalist artificial language meant to ideo-
logically align thought and action with the aims of the government. What 
Goldsmith and Posner seek to accomplish through their book is not that 
different from what Orwell's fictional government sought through the use of 
the Newspeak concept of "Blackwhite." Orwell described "Blackwhite" as 
the "loyal willingness to say black is white when Party discipline demands 
this. But it means also the ability to believe black is white, and more, 
to know black is white, and to forget that one has ever believed the 
contrary." 104 
Most neo-realists and rationalists who seek to discount the influence 
of international law tend to avoid even using the tenn "international law" or 
"international obligation"--preferring to speak of international "principles," 
"norms," "standards," "precepts," "rules," and "procedures." 105 Goldsmith 
and Posner's objective is much more ambitious: they seek to reverse the 
meaning of the term altogether. Thus, under the Goldsmith and Posner pa-
radigm, whenever one thinks of "binding" international legal obligations, 
they are expected to understand the term to actually mean "non-binding"; 
whenever one thinks of international "law" they are expected to understand 
the term to really mean international "politics." 
V. A MODERN CASE STUDY: THE OLC TORTURE MEMOS 
In light of subsequent revelations, it is surprising that Goldsmith 
and Posner did not include the case study of the treatment of detainees in 
the war on terror in their book, especially since Goldsmith gives a first-hand 
account of the decision-making that led to the promulgation of the "White 
101 
Berman, supra note 60, at 1306. 
102 
George Orwell, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in THE COLLECTED 
ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LEITERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127 (1968). 
103 
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1981). 
104 
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House Torture Memos" in his later book, The Terror Presidency. 106 Because 
it reflects the contemporary state of the international community and the 
current U.S. perceptions about the role of international law, and because 
there is a concrete paper trail of the legal positions of the relevant actors, the 
story of the Torture Memos is in many ways a better vehicle for examining 
the binding nature of international law than the older historic anecdotes that 
Goldsmith and Posner rely on in their book. The facts set forth below reflect 
the unanimous findings of a bi-partisan panel of twenty-five Senators fol-
lowing extensive hearings into the matter in the summer and fall of 2008. 107 
In some cases, these findings are supplemented by interviews of the prin-
cipal players conducted by Professor Philippe Sands, 108 the personal recol-
lections of Jack Goldsmith 109 and John Yoo, IJO and the commentary of two 
of the Legal Advisers that I interviewed for a related book project-William 
Taft and John Bellinger. 
The story begins soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Rather than vet questions re-
lated to the interpretation of international law to the legal departments of all 
the relevant agencies, much of the legal work related to the war on terrorism 
was done by a self-styled "war council," composed of White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President's Counsel David Addington, the Pen-
tagon's Chief Counsel Jim Haynes, and the Deputy head of the Department 
of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and John Yoo, who Goldsmith 
identifies as a fellow "new sovereigntist." 111 David Addington was reported-
ly the dominant force among the group, 112 and one high-level Bush Admin-
istration insider told Philippe Sands that "if you favored international law, 
you were in danger of being called 'soft on terrorism' by Addington."m 
Notably absent from the group were the State Department Legal Adviser, 
William Taft, and NSC Chief Counsel, John Bellinger, who would three 
years later replace Taft as State Department Legal Adviser. Since OLC had 
106 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at I42, I72. 
107 See U.S. Senate Armed Servs. Comm., Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into 
the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, I lOth Cong. (Dec. II, 2008), available at 
http://Ievin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.I2Il 08.pdf [hereinafter Com-
mittee Inquiry]. The full two hundred and sixty-three page report, which was subsequently 
de-classified and released in May 2009, is available at: http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
supporting/2009/SASC.DetaineeReport.042209.pdf. 
108 See PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM (2008). 
109 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3. 
110 JoHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
I68 (2006). 
III GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 2I-22. 
112 SANDS, supra note 108, at 2I3. 
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the power to issue opinions that were binding throughout the executive 
branch, in coordination with the war council, John Yoo wrote opinion after 
opinion approving every aspect of the Bush Administration's aggressive 
antiterrorism efforts, giving counter-terrorism officials and personnel "the 
comfort of knowing that they could not easily be prosecuted later for the 
d t . ,1!4 approve ac wns. 
John Yoo believed "the candid approach would be to admit that our 
old laws and policies did not address this new enemy [al-Qaeda]." 115 On 
January 9, 2002, Yoo authored a key memorandum, providing legal argu-
ments to support administration officials' assertions that the Geneva Con-
ventions did not apply to detainees from the war in Afghanistan. On January 
25, 2002, Gonzales sent a memo (ghost-written by Addington) 116 to Presi-
dent Bush, which opined that the advice in the January 9th OLC memoran-
dum was sound and that the President should declare the Taliban and al-
Qaeda outside the coverage of the Geneva Conventions. 117 This, Gonzales 
pointed out, would keep American interrogators from being exposed to the 
War Crimes Act, a 1996 law that makes it a federal crime to cause a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions or a violation of Common Article 3. 118 
Gonzales's memo described the war against terrorism as "a new kind of 
war" and a "new paradigm" that showed Geneva's strict limitations on 
questioning of enemy prisoners" to be "obsolete" and even "quaint." 119 
When he learned of the Gonzales memorandum, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell quickly prepared a memorandum for the White House, stating 
that the advantages of applying the Geneva Conventions to the Afghan de-
tainees far outweighed those of their rejection. 120 Powell said that declaring 
the conventions inapplicable would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy 
and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the pro-
tections of the laws of war for our troops .... " 121 He added that it would 
114 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 23. 
115 Yoo, supra note 11 0, at 4 7. See also id. at 22. 
116 Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power, WASH. 
POST, June 25, 2007, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/ 
pushing_ the_ envelope_ on _presi/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
117 Jd. 
118 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006). 
1!9 
. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to George W. Bush, President, Deci-
Sion ReApplication of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI 
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. REs. J. lNT'L. L. 615 (2006). 
120 
Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel 
to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the 
~neva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. 
s. J.lNT'L. L. 615 (2006) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. 
121 I d. at 2. 
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"undermine public support among critical allies .... " 122 An accompanying 
memorandum prepared by State Department Legal Adviser William Taft 
opined that it is important for the U.S. to confirm "that even in a new sort of 
conflict the United States bases its conduct on its international treaty obliga-
tions and the rule of law, not just its policy preferences." 123 Despite Powell 
and Taft's contrary advice, on February 7, the President signed a memoran-
dum stating that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict and 
that al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not entitled to prisoner of war 
status or the protections afforded by the Third Geneva Convention. 124 Al-
though the President's order stated that "as a matter of policy, the United 
States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely," the deci-
sion to replace compliance with the Geneva Conventions with a policy sub-
ject to discretionary interpretation set the stage for the serious abuses that 
were to follow. 125 
A few months later, on August I, 2002, John Yoo issued two OLC 
memos signed by his boss, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. 126 The 
first, addressed to White House Chief Counsel Gonzales, opined that inter-
rogators could inflict pain and suffering on detainees, up to the level caused 
by "organ failure" without violating the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture 
Convention) and the U.S. federal statutes that implanted the Torture Con-
vention. 127 Yoo derived his definition of torture from a completely unrelated 
statute that authorized benefits for emergency health conditions, using the 
phrase "severe pain" as a possible indicator of an emergency condition that 
might cause serious harm if not immediately treated. 128 Yoo's memo also 
advised that under the doctrine of "necessity" the President could supersede 
national and international laws prohibiting torture. 129 The second August 1, 
2002 OLC memo, which responded to a request from the CIA, specifically 
122 Id 
123 Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, The Legal Adviser, Department of State, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva 
Convention (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 615 (2006). 
124 Committee Inquily, supra note 107, at xiii. 
!25 Id 
126 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 
18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 615 
(2006) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum]; Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 
(Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE. W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 615 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo Let-
ter]. 
127 See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 126. 
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opined that "waterboarding" did not rise to the level of torture in violation 
· . I d . I 130 ofmternatwna or omest1c aw. 
Two months later, on October 11, 2002, after meeting with Gon-
zales, Addington, and Haynes in Cuba, J3J the Commander of Guantanamo 
Bay, Major General Michael Dunlavey, sent a memo to the Pentagon re-
questing authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques that were orig-
inally designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our enemies against our 
own soldiers, including tactics used by the Communist Chinese to elicit 
false confessions from U.S. military personnel. 132 These included "stress 
positions," "exploitation of detainee fears," "removal of clothing," "hood-
ing," "deprivation of light and sound," "deprivation of sleep," and "water-
boarding."133 Dunlavey's memo stated that the existing techniques permit-
ted by the Army Field Manual 34-52 had been exhausted, and that some 
detainees--in particular Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian believed 
to be the twentieth 9/11 hijacker--had more infonnation that was vital to 
US . I · 134 . . nahona secunty. 
Given a four-day deadline, and without access to international law 
books or databases, Guantanamo's Staff Judge Advocate Lt. Col. Diane 
Beaver wrote an analysis justifying the legality of the techniques. 135 Lt. Col. 
Beaver expected that a broader legal review conducted at more senior levels 
would follow her own. 136 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Richard Myers solicited the views of the several branches of the military. 137 
All stated their opposition. The Air Force cited "serious concerns regarding 
the legality of many of the proposed techniques." 138 The Chief of the Ar-
my's International and Operational Law Division wrote that the techniques 
"cross the line of 'humane' treatJnent" and would "likely be considered mal-
treatJnent" under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and "may violate the 
torture statute."139 The Mfu-ine Corps stated that the requested techniques 
"arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to 
possible prosecution." 140 
13o S M fr . f . ee emorandum om Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't o Justice, to 
John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Aug. 1, 2002, available 
at: http:/!1uxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o1 0/clients/aclu/olc _ 08012002 _ bybee.pdf. 
131 See SANDs, supra note 108, at 63-64, 129. 
132 Committee Inquiry, supra note 107, at xvii. 
133 !d. 
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State Department Legal Advisers William Taft provided the author 
the following account of the role his Office played during this period: 
In the months following the President's decision, the Legal Adviser's Of-
fice drafted a lengthy memorandum which concluded that because our pol-
icy was to treat the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees consistent with the re-
quirements of the Geneva Conventions, the question of whether they were 
entitled to this as a matter of law was moot. (This draft memo was made 
public by the Administration in January of2005.) The draft also expressed 
the view that customary international law required that the detainees in any 
event be treated humanely and had certain of the rights set out in the Con-
ventions. We thought that because it was our policy to treat the detainees 
consistent with the Conventions, that this was being done. It developed, 
however, that at the same time we were working on our memo and subse-
quently the Department of Justice lawyers were working separately 
with the lawyers at the Department of Defense to authorize certain depar-
tures from the Conventions' terms in the treatment of the detainees, partic-
ularly with regard to methods of interrogation. I and my staff were not in-
vited to review this work and we were, indeed, unaware that it was being 
done .... 
It was highly regrettable that the Legal Adviser's Office was not involved 
in the legal work following the decisions in February 2002. I think that we 
were excluded because it was suspected, in light of some of the positions 
we had taken, that we would not agree with some of the conclusions other 
lawyers in the Administration expected to reach and that we might leak in-
formation about the work to the press. It was somewhat ironic that when 
the fact of the work subsequently did become known, it was clear that we 
at least were not responsible for this because we had been excluded. I am 
convinced, however, that if we had been involved and our views consi-
dered, several conclusions that were not consistent with our treaty obliga-
tions under the Convention Against Torture and our obligations under cus-
tomary international law would not have been reached. Later, in 2004, 
when we worked with the Department of Justice on the revision of 
the memorandum on the Torture Convention that had been withdrawn 
earlier in the year, we were able to reach agreement on a very respectable 
. . 141 
opmwn. 
Having cut out the State Department Office of Legal Adviser, and 
ignoring the serious concerns raised by the senior lawyers of the military 
services, on November 27, 2002, Jim Haynes, the Pentagon's chief lawyer, 
and a member of the so-called "war cabinet" who had been Best Man at 
David Addington's wedding, 142 sent a one-page memo to Secretary of De-
141 William Taft, E-mail Supplement to Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers, 
Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, reproduced in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 92. 
142 See SANDs, supra note 108, at 95. 
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fense Rumsfeld recommending that he approve the techniques requested by 
Guantanamo Bay. 143 A few days later, on December 2, 2002, Secretary 
Rumsfeld signed Haynes' recommendation, adding a handwritten note that 
referred to limits proposed in the memo on the use of stress positions: "I 
stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" 144 By De-
cember 30, 2002, the interrogators at Guantanamo Bay were employing the 
extraordinary interrogation techniques--including hooding, removal of 
clothing, stress positions, twenty-hour interrogations, and use of dogs--Dn 
Mohammed al-Qahtani and several other detainees· 145 
A month later, these same techniques were being used at the U.S. 
detention center at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and after the March 
2003 invasion oflraq they migrated to the Abu Ghraib detention facility. 146 
In his "insider's account of the war on terror," War by Other Means, John 
Y oo dismisses the migration theory as "an exercise in hyperbole and parti-
san smear." 147 According to the Senate Bi-Partisan Committee Report, 
however, 
[t]he abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the re-
sult of a few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques such as 
stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and 
using military working dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after 
they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at [Guantanamo 
Bay].J48 
Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy General 
Counsel Alberto Mora spoke with Haynes three times to express his con-
cerns about the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay, opining that 
they constituted at a minimum, cruel and inhumane treatment and "could 
rise to the level of torture," and "probably will cause significant harm to our 
national legal, political, military, and diplomatic interests." 149 He prepared a 
memo to that effect, which he threatened to sign unless he heard definitively 
that the use of the techniques had been suspended. 150 Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld signed a memo rescinding authority for the techniques on January 
15, 2003, 151 though word ofthe suspension apparently never got to Afgha-
143 Committee Inquiry, supra note I 07, at xix. 
144 Id 
145 Id at xx-xxiv. 
146 I d. at xxii-xxiii. 
147 
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148 
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149 
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nistan or Iraq. That same day, Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a 
"Working Group" to review the interrogation techniques and requested 
another legal opinion from OLC in light of the objections that had been 
raised. 152 
On March 14, 2003, John Yoo provided an OLC memorandum 
which repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had said six months 
earlier about the definition of torture. 153 In addition, it stated that interroga-
tors could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interroga-
tion methods that would otherwise violate the law. 154 This part of the opi-
nion can be reduced to the core proposition that, as Richard Nixon said in 
relation to Watergate, "if the president does it, then, that means it's legal." 
155 The Secretary of Defense rejected the legal advice of the military servic-
es in favor of that provided by Yoo, and on April 16, 2003, authorized the 
use of twenty-four specific interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo 
Bay. 156 In addition, the Secretary's memo stated that "if, in your view, you 
require additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you 
should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written 
request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and 
the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee." 157 Rumsfeld subse-
quently approved specific requests for hooding, sensory deprivation, and 
"sleep adjustment." 158 
In his memoir, Goldsmith describes the role he played as head of 
the Department of Justice's OLC from October 2003 to June 2004 in with-
drawing the controversial August 1, 2002 and March 14, 2003 OLC opi-
nions on what constitutes prohibited acts of torture, and whether the federal 
torture statute would apply to military interrogations of "unlawful enemy 
combatants," authored by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee and Depu-
ty Assistant Attorney General John Yoo. 159 When his memoir was published 
152 Id 
153 Id 
154 Id at xxi-xxii. 
155 See Scott Horton, A Kinder, Gentler Lawfare, HARPER'S, Nov. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/ll/hbc-90001803 (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
156 Committee Inquiry, supra note 107, at xxii. 
157 Id at xxii. 
158 Id at xxii-xxiii. 
159 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 141-76. The Bybee-Yoo memos opined that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to "unlawful combatants" that obligations under human rights 
treaties do not apply to conduct outside of the territory of the U.S., and that the Torture Con-
vention prohibited only the most extreme forms of intentionally inflicted harm, namely those 
causing the most severe kind of physical pain tantamount to death or organ failure or psycho-
logical forms of pressure that cause permanent or prolonged mental harm, and that this nar-
row ban applies only when interrogators specifically intend such harms but not when they are 
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in 2007, Goldsmith was anointed as a hero by the media for rescinding these 
Torture Memos and resigning from OLC rather than compromise his 
principles--actions which Newsweek called "a quietly dramatic profile in 
"!60 
courage. 
Paradoxically, Goldsmith acknowledges that he did not rescind 
Yoo's Torture Memos because he thought they had reached the wrong con-
clusions, but rather because he thought the memos "rested on cursory and 
one-sided legal arguments" and were "legally flawed, tendentious in sub-
stance and tone, and overbroad and thus largely unnecessary." 161 Indeed, 
Goldsmith confirms that he believed extraordinary interrogation techniques 
can be legally justified in situations "in which the President believed that 
exceeding the law was necessary in an emergency, leaving the torture law 
intact in the vast majority of instances." 162 Notably, the 2004 OLC memo 
that replaced Y oo 's 2002 work contained a footnote saying that "all the 
interrogation methods that earlier opinions had found legal were still le-
gal."163 Yoo has asserted that Goldsmith's withdrawal of Yoo's 2002 opi-
nion was merely "for appearances' sake" to divert public criticism in the 
immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib controversy. "In the real world of 
interrogation policy nothing had changed."164 
More significantly, Goldsmith glosses over the tale of his own 
"Torture Memo," a March 19, 2004 OLC memorandum that he authored, 
which has been described as a "roadmap to the outsourcing of torture and 
other forms of abuse" to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
and Syria. 165 He also tries to downplay the fact that when Yoo wrote the 
OLC opinion of August 1, 2002-the memorandum that Goldsmith res-
cinded-Y oo also issued a second eighteen-page memorandum to the CIA 
seeking infonnation to defend the nation from hann. The memos likely led to the use of 
water-boarding and other notorious abuses at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay. 
160 
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on the same day which concluded that specific proposed techniques, includ-
ing waterboarding, were compatible with international law. 166 Goldsmith 
left the memo to the CIA in place, with the effect of providing CIA person-
nel what Goldsmith describes as a "golden shield"167 that would protect 
them against prosecutions under the Federal War Crimes Act 168 and the 
Federal Anti-Torture Act. 169 
In December 2008 a bipartisan panel of twenty-five Senators un-
animously concluded that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
and several former high-level Whitehouse, Pentagon, and Justice Depart-
ment lawyers bear direct responsibility for serious human rights abuses at 
Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere. 170 The report concludes that 
"senior officials in the United States government solicited information on 
how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appear-
ance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees." 171 Specifi-
cally with respect to the responsibility of the government lawyers, the Re-
port states: "Those OLC opinions distorted the meaning and intent of anti-
torture laws, rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influ-
enced Department of Defense determinations as to what interrogation tech-
166 GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 155-56. In explaining why he did not rescind the August 
1, 2002 Yoo/Bybee memo to the CIA, Goldsmith writes: 
And in contrast to my sense of the Defense Department techniques [which 
Goldsmith believed would be legally justified under proper legal analysis], I wasn't 
as confident that the CIA techniques [including waterboarding] could be approved 
under a proper legal analysis. I didn't affirmatively believe they were illegal either, 
or else I would have stopped them. I just didn't know yet. And I wouldn't know 
until we had figured out the proper interpretation of the torture statute, and whether 
the CIA techniques were consistent with that proper legal analysis. 
Id The August 1, 2002 Yoo/Bybee memo to the CIA was publicly released by the Obama 
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niques were legal for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. military 
1 ,172 personne.
Citing the Nuremberg-era Alstoetter case, Jose Alverez, a Columbia 
Law School professor who had served in the Office of the Legal Adviser at 
the U.S. Department of State and later as President of the American Society 
oflnternational Law, concluded: "when government lawyers torture the rule 
of law as gravely as they [Y oo, Addington, Haynes, and Goldsmith] have 
done here, international as well as national crimes may have been commit-
ted, including by the lawyers themselves." 173 Jurists, the Prosecutor of the 
Alstoetter case told the Nuremberg judges in 1946, "can no more escape ... 
responsibility by virtue of their judicial robes than the general by his uni-
form." 174 The analogy here is not to the scale of the atrocities, but rather to 
the theory of liability. Consistent with this, human rights and civil rights 
organizations have called for domestic prosecution of these individuals in 
the U.S. under federal statutes that criminalize torture and war crimes, 175 
and some of the victims have lodged civil suits against them in federal 
court. 176 At the same time, criminal complaints against these individuals 
have been filed in Spain, Germany, France, Argentina, and Sweden under 
"universal jurisdiction" statutes enabling them to prosecute anyone respon-
sible for torture that is present in their territory. 177 
172 !d. at xxvi-xxvii. 
173 Alvarez, supra note 165, at 223. According to Professor Alvarez's critique, the authors 
of the OLC Memos misconstrued various U.S. treaty obligations prohibiting torture or ig-
nored them altogether, they ignored the plain meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, they turned the Convention Against Torture into the convention for certain 
kinds of torture when it came to actions outside the U.S., and they selectively chose non-U.S. 
judicial authorities to reflect conclusions concerning the severity of pain needed to constitute 
~orture and dismissed customary law in a way that was cavalier and reckless. See generally 
zd. 
174 
3 TRIALs OF WAR CruMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAWNo.10 at 32 (1951). 
175 ' 
See REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON 
CONFERENCE ON PLANNING FOR THE PROSECUTION OF HJGH LEVEL AMERICAN WAR 
iRIMINAL~ (Jan. 12, 2009) (chaired by Lawrence Velve1, Dean of Massachusetts School of 
2 
aw), avazlable at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0901/S00123.htrn (last visited Oct. 24, 
009); Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Asks Justice Department to Appoint Independent Pros-
~~~tor to Investigate Torture (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/ 
A 60prs20090318.html?s_src=RSS (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (includes text of letter to 
17~omey General Eric Holder from ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero). 
ta ,;ose Padilla, the first American citizen to be designated an "unlawful enemy comba-
h nt,filrepresented by the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, 0 J~am1 · Jhn · hn J d J agamst o Yoo for authormg the "torture memos." See Jo Schwartz, 
C::, ;e hAllows Civil Lawsuit Over Claims of Torture, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 2009, at A16, 
17~1 a le at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14yoo.html. 
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Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006, and 2008, the U.S: Supreme Court is~ 
sued a trio of opinions on the detainee issue that began to swing the pendu~ 
lum back in favor of international law and away from unfettered Presiden~ 
tial power in the war on terror. In 2004, the Court decided the case of Rasul 
v. Bush, rejecting by a six to three majority the President's contention that 
Guantanamo Bay was outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and ruling 
that detainees there must be provided access to legal assistance and given 
judicial review of the legality of their detention. 178 The Bush Administration 
purported to implement the Rasul decision by establishing a Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay to determine on a case-by~case 
basis the status of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. 179 The Combat Status 
Review Tribunal process did not, however, provide the detainee's assistance 
of counsel or any means to find or present evidence to challenge the Gov~ 
emment's case. A few months later, when Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (popularly known as the McCain amendment), 180 
which prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees including at Guantanamo 
Bay, President Bush issued a signing statement in which he asserted his 
Constitutional authority to depart from the law when warranted by interests 
of national security. 181 
Next, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court 
held by a five to three majority that the military tribunals established by 
Executive Order to prosecute accused al-Qaeda terrorists were unlawful 
because their procedures "violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Jus~ 
tice] and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949."182 The Supreme 
wood Ross, Many High Bush Officials Violated Anti-Torture Laws, AM. C!-IRON., Jan. 13, 
2009, available at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/printfriendly/87739 (last vi-
sited Oct. 24, 2009). Similar criminal complaints have also been filed against Rumsfeld and 
others in Argentina, France, Sweden, and !pOSt recently in Spain. Jane Mayer, The Bush Six, 
NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 23, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2009/ 
04!13/090413ta_talk _ rriayer (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
178 See 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
179 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
180 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739---42. To avoid the President's threatened veto, the Detainee Treatment legislation was 
revised before enactment to exempt the CIA from its requirements and to stipulate that detai-
nees do not have a right to challenge their detention in U.S. court. 
181 Press Release, George W. Bush, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863 (Dec. 
30, 2005), available at http:l/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/ 
20051230-S.html. John Yoo has explained the significance of the signing statement in the 
following terms: "McCain's amendment did not explicitly prohibit necessity or self-defense 
as common law defenses. Thus, under the law, these defenses will continue to exist, as they 
did in the earlier 1994 anti-torture law." Yoo, supra note 110, at 200. 
182 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
2009] INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE TORTURE MEMOS 353 
Court confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied 
to all Guantanamo detainees, whether they were Taliban or al-Qaeda. 183 
"Common Article 3," wrote the Court, "affords some minimal protection, 
falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals ... who 
are involved in a conflict 'in the territory' of a signatory."184 The Court 
reached this conclusion by looking at the official commentaries to the Ge-
neva Convention, which confmned its wide scope. 185 The Court invoked the 
U.S. Army's Law of War Handbook, which described Common Article 3 as 
"a minimum yardstick of protection in all conflicts, not just internal armed 
conflicts." 186 The Court also relied on decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
. 187 
VIa. 
Shortly thereafter, at the urging of President Bush, the Republican-
controlled Congress responded by enacting the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, which provided a legislative basis for Military Commissions to try 
unlawful enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay and stripped the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear suits by enemy combatants relating to any as-
pect of their transfer, detention, treatment, trial, or conditions of confine-
ment. 188 Two years later, in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, 189 the Supreme 
Court declared parts of the Military Commissions Act unconstitutional, de-
termined that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were "inadequate," 
and ruled that the two-hundred and seventy foreign detainees held for years 
at Guantanamo Bay have the right to appeal to U.S. civilian courts to chal-
lenge their indefinite imprisonment without charges. 190 Guantanamo was 
designed as a law-free zone, a place where the government could subject 
detainees to indefinite incarceration and harsh interrogation techniques 
without having to worry about the legality of such action. The Boumediene 
decision undercut a core rationale for keeping the detention facility off 
American soil. Justice Antho~lY Kennedy, writing for the five to four ma-
jority, acknowledged the terrorism threat the U.S. faces, but he declared, 
"[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in 
extraordinary times." 191 
183 !d. at 631-32. 
184 !d. at 631. 
185 !d. at n.63. 
186 !d. 
187 !d. 
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See generally Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
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128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
190 !d. at 2240. 
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Over and over again, the Bush Administration had asserted '\v 
don't do torture." That pretense was definitively put to rest on January 14e 
2009, ':hen Susan Crawfo~~, the Bush ~~stration-appointed Convenin~ 
Authonty of the U.S. M1htary Commisswns and a former Chief Judge 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, announced the dropping 
of charges against Mohamed al-Qahtani, the detainee for whom the en-
hanced interrogation policy was originally designed. 192 Without equivoca-
tion, Crawford declared, "[w]e tortured al-Qahtani .... His treatment met 
the legal definition of torture. And that's why I did not refer the case for 
. "193 . prosecutwn. 
A week later, on January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as 
the forty-fourth President of the U.S. Just two days into his presidency, on 
January 22, 2009, President Obama signed Executive Orders requiring the 
closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility within· twelve months, 194 the dis-
mantling of the CIA's network of secret prisons around the globe, 195 and 
prohibiting the CIA from using coercive interrogation methods that deviate 
from the requirements of the Army Field Manual. 196 The Executive Order 
on Interrogations specifically prohibits U.S. government personnel or agents 
from relying on the OLC Memos in interpreting Federal criminal laws, the 
Convention against Torture, or the requirements of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions. This changing of the guard is not the end of the 
story, for closing down Guantanamo will present significant challenges to 
the new Administration, but it is the beginning of the end. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
What does the case study of the torture memos tell us about the na-
ture of international law? First, if one were to have taken what could be 
called a "semiotic snapshot" of the detainee story when the Torture Memos 
first leaked out in 2004, the perception of the U.S.' commitment to comply 
with international law would be very different than the perception reflected 
by the legislative, judicial, and executive branch actions in 2008-2009. 
Second, the case study demonstrates that to understand State inter-
ests and behavior, the State must be disaggregated into its components, and 
sometimes those components must be further disaggregated. Nonnally, the 
President would receive legal advice from top agency lawyers throughout 
the government, often with conflicting interpretations of international law. 
192 Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says US. Official; Trial Overseer Cites "Abusive" 
Methods Against 9/ll Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A I. 
193 Id 
194 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
195 Woodward, supra note 192. 
196 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
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The State Department Legal Adviser would ordinarily be among the entities 
advocating most forcefully for compliance with international law. In this 
case, however, the normal process of inclusive clearance was for a short 
time circumvented by a like-minded cabal of aggressive lawyers calling 
themselves the "war council" whose influence initially masked the consi-
derable inter and intra-departmental disagreement and dominated detainee 
1. 197 po 1cy. 
Eventually, both Congress and the Supreme Court inserted them-
selves into the question, and thereby forced the President to alter his policies 
in order to bring them into accord with their view of the requirements of the 
Torture Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and customary international 
law. As former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger recounts, 
the government legal offices that had been frozen out of the initial le-
gal/policy decisions (including the State Department Office of Legal Advis-
er) then ended up playing an influential role in formulating the new inter-
pretations and policies: 
197 
When I moved to the State Department with Secretary Rice in 2005, first 
as Senior Adviser and ultimately as Legal Adviser, I was deeply concerned 
by international (and domestic) perceptions that the Bush Administration 
not only did not believe in international law but was actively hostile to-
wards it .... In the Bush Administration's second term, [the State De-
partment Legal Adviser] lawyers led the efforts inside the Administration 
to clarify and adopt a .~pore robust legal framework for the detention, 
treatment, and prosecution of captured terrorists ... [the State Department 
Legal Adviser] was instrumental in helping Secretary Rice persuade the 
rest of the Administration to move high-level al-Qaeda detainees held by 
the Central Intelligence Agency to Guantanamo in September, 2006, so 
that they could be prosecuted for their offenses, given access to counsel 
and the ICRC, and no longer held in undisclosed locations. [The State De-
partment Legal Adviser] attorneys also tried bard to ensure that the CIA's 
interrogation program and the President's Executive Order applicable to it 
were consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005 and the Hamdan 
John Y oo has been quite open in explaining why the "war council" cut the State De-
paru_nent Office of Legal Adviser out of the decision making process concerning treatment of 
det~mees: "The State Department and OLC often disagreed about international law. State 
beheved that international law had a binding effect on the President, indeed on the United 
~tates, both internationally and domestically," whereas Yoo did not hold to that view. See 
. oo, ~upra note 110, at 33. Rather than prove that international law was not relevant, the 
~:~ntl~~al circumvention of the State Department Legal Adviser indicates that Yoo and his 
Se ow war council" members believed that if the top policy makers were made aware of the 
t~ate Department Legal Adviser's views about the applicable international legal constraints 
b eyhw~uld be mu_ch less likely to approve the extraordinary interrogation tactics advocated 
Y t e war counc11." 
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decision in 2006, which concluded that Common Article 3 applied to the 
treatment of al-Qaeda detainees. 198 
Third, consistent with institutionalist and constructivist models, the 
positions of the State Department Legal Adviser and his counterparts in the 
various branches of the armed services demonstrated that important bureau-
cratic players perceived the Torture Convention, Geneva Conventions, and 
customary international law as applicable and binding. Like the State De-
partment Office of the Legal Adviser, 199 the legal offices of the various ser-
vices were staffed by careerists who had internalized and absorbed a strong 
belief in the constraints and value of international law. George W. Bush's 
Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, explained the 
nature of this culture of compliance in the following terms: "[ w ]e train our 
people to obey the Geneva Conventions, it's not even a matter of whether it 
is reciprocated-it's a matter of who we are. " 200 Their views were rein-
forced by the positions taken by foreign bodies and international organiza-
tions. In particular, the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. Special Rappor-
teurs on Torture and Arbitrary Detention, the U.K. House of Commons, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights all opined that the U.S.' treatment of detainees was 
inconsistent with the requirements of international law. 201 
These same bureaucratic players repeatedly warned about reciproci-
ty costs and the prospects of prosecution for violating the international pro-
hibition against torture. Concern about bilateral retaliation adds credence to 
the Goldsmith and Posner paradigm but concern about long-term multilater-
al or systemic reciprocity suggests something else entirely. When career 
lawyers warn that third States will cite U.S. actions that dismiss or minimize 
international law as precedent in their relations with their neighbor coun-
198 John Bellinger, E-mail Supplement to Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers, 
Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar. 7, 2009, reproduced in 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 92. 
199 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apr. 1, 2004, transcript reproduced in ScHARF 
& WILLIAMS, supra riote 92 (describing the State Department Legal Adviser as "the moral 
conscience of American foreign policy."). 
200 SANDS, supra note 108, at 33. See also MARK 0SIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, 
TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 330-33 (2009). 
201 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006); HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNuAL REPORT 2005, 2005-6, H.C. 574, available at http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/crn200506/cmselect/cmfaff/574/57402.htm; INTER-AM. 
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (Mar. 12, 2002), 
available at http://www.photius.com/rogue nations/guantanamo.htrnl; Neil Lewis, Red Cross 
Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at AI. 
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tries, they are expressing concern about increasing international instability 
through the weakening of the rule oflaw at large. 
While concern by government officials about criminal prosecution 
or civil suit under domestic statutes that also happen to incorporate interna-
tional law may not constitute evidence disproving Goldsmith and Posner's 
claims, concern for prosecution in third States or international tribunals un-
der the international law concept of universal jurisdiction as codified in the 
Torture Convention and Geneva Conventions does suggest an exogenous 
influence of international law. Moreover, when U.S. courts interpret interna-
tional law as a limit to Executive Power, as the Supreme Court did in the 
Hamdan case, we are seeing the concrete effects of internalization of inter-
national law by a disaggregated State. Moreover, civil actions and criminal 
complaints cannot be so cavalierly dismissed as "lawfare" when they are 
brought by respected American-based lawyers groups and civil rights organ-
izations or by allied democratic governments. 202 
Finally, influential players within the Executive and Legislative 
branches stressed the important role of reputation concerns in setting detai-
nee policy. The bi-partisan Commission that investigated the 9111 attacks 
concluded in a report in 2005 that "the U.S. policy on treating detainees is 
undermining the war on terrorism by tarnishing America's reputation as a 
moral leader."203 The 2008 Senate Bipartisan Committee Report similarly 
observed: "[t]he impact of those abuses has been significant."204 Citing polls 
indicating that Abu Ghraib and Guanttmamo Bay have generated negative 
perceptions of the U.S. as a country that does not respect or abide by the 
rule of law by the populations and government officials of countries around 
the globe, including our closest democratic allies, the Committee concluded 
"[t]he fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates 
our ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, 
and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save lives. "205 Conse-
quently, concern about reputation is a much lJlOre important factor in deter-
mining compliance with international law than Goldsmith and Posner have 
acknowledged, especially in a situation where the initial decision to depart 
from international obligations produced such immediate and significant 
reputational costs. 
202 
Neal Katyal, the lawyer who briefed and argued the Hamdan case before the federal 
co~s, has described the motivation of the plaintiff's lawyers involved in litigating the detai-
~ee Issue in the following terms: "This is the new civil rights movement. Now it's intema-
t~~~allaw, and especially international humanitarian law." OSIEL, supra note 200, at 340. 
T Barbara Slavin, Abuse of Detainees Undercuts U.S. Authority, 9/11 Panel Says, USA 
2~DAY, Nov. 15, 2005, at 8A. 
205 Committee Inquiry, supra note 107, at xxv. 
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"Under our ~~eory," _write Goldsmith and Posner in The Limits of 
International Law, mternatwnal law does not pull states toward com-
1. h . . "206 Th d f h p mnce contrary to t err mterests . . . . e case stu y o t e treatment of 
detainees set forth above highlights the major flaws in Goldsmith and Posn-
er's approach, proving their theoretical model to be neither accurately de-
scriptive nor predictive. In the final analysis, the torture memo case study 
has shown that international law is real because it plays a real role in shap-
ing the conduct of States--even a superpower in times of crisis. 
206 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 13. 
